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Abstract 
This paper reports on a desk-study on innovation performance and policies influencing it in four Nordic 
countries. The study is entirely based on published sources, either on the web (Eurostat, the OECD, the 
World Bank etc.), or in the form of articles, books, reports and evaluations. The first section introduces 
the study and deals with conceptual issues. Section two contains a descriptive analysis of innovation 
activities in the Nordic area and a broader set of countries with which the Nordic countries may be 
compared with the help of data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and other relevant sources. 
Section three of the paper, then, presents - for four Nordic countries – an analysis of their innovation 
policies and how these have evolved towards their present stance. Lessons and questions for further 
research are discussed in the fourth and final section. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper reports on a desk-study on innovation performance and policies influencing it in four Nordic 
countries. The study is entirely based on published sources, either on the web (Eurostat, the OECD, the 
World Bank etc.), or in the form of articles, books, reports and evaluations. It would of course have been 
interesting to collect new data on the subject through surveys or interviews etc. but given the limited 
time and resources this was not possible.  
Why is innovation and associated policy instruments interesting for a study of the Nordic countries’ 
development? The reason, we will argue, is mainly the close relationship that economic theory 
postulates between innovation broadly defined and economic growth. The notion “broadly defined” 
signals that the term innovation in the present context encompasses the entire innovation process from, 
say,  the creation new products, processes or ways to do things to the application and spread of these in 
the economic system. It would of course be possible to define innovation more narrowly, and for some 
purposes that may be justifiable or even essential. However, with respect to the effects on the economy, 
a broad perspective is the most appropriate, since what matters economically is not mainly the 
occurrence of new innovations but their subsequent diffusion in the economic system and the learning 
effects, further improvements and changes that this gives rise to.1 
The increasing focus on innovation among economists and social scientists from the 1970s onwards 
gave around 1990 birth to a new and more holistic way to analyze innovation dynamics at the national 
level, the national systems of innovation approach (Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993), which 
subsequently have been applied in studies of a number of different countries (see e.g., Edquist and 
Hommen 2009). The approach has also been adopted by the OECD in its evaluations of the national 
innovation systems and policies affecting them in for example Norway and Sweden (OECD 2008, 2013). 
One of the characteristics of the approach is a strong emphasis on having a historical perspective.  A 
national system of innovation, it is argued, is formed over a long period of time through interaction – or 
coevolution - between its economic system (major industries, firms etc.) and its political system 
(Fagerberg et al. 2009a,b). Such processes, though which one part of the system influences the other 
and vice versa, are also likely to be path dependent, meaning that established policies – and the 
organizations carrying them out – may be remarkably persistent in spite of changes in the environment. 
As argued by Narula (2002) this may lead to a situation in which established actors in areas of traditional 
strength may find themselves much better served by the system than new actors in emerging sectors. 
The term “innovation policy” is relatively new and may be used in different ways. However, the fact that 
the term itself is quite recent does not imply that policies affecting innovation did not exist before. On 
the contrary, innovation is an old phenomenon and so are policies affecting it. Therefore, when 
discussing the evolution of the national innovation systems and innovation policies in the Nordic 
countries, we try to include, when relevant, policies or parts thereof with other labels, such as science 
policy, research policy, technology policy, industrial policy etc. A broad definition of innovation policy 
might be the set of policy instruments that affects the innovation performance of a country, while a 
                                                          
1
 An early advocate of a broad perspective on innovation was Christopher Freeman, one of the most influential 
pioneers in the field of innovation studies. See Fagerberg et al (2011) for more on Freeman’s work. 
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narrower definition might include only policy instruments explicitly created with the effects on 
innovation in mind.  A clear advantage of the broad definition is that it encourages the analyst to 
consider the possible impact on innovation of policy instruments created with other purposes in mind, 
such as, for example, health policy, which arguably has played a very important role for innovation in 
the United States just to mention one example.  However, although we find the broad definition of 
innovation policy preferable from a theoretical point of view, and we will attempt to apply it, the 
present study cannot – given its limitations – go further in this respect than the sources, e.g., the 
existing literature on the subject, allows.    
The next section contains a descriptive analysis of innovation activities in the Nordic area and a broader 
set of countries with which the Nordic countries are compared with the help of data from the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and other relevant sources. The analysis shows that although the 
Nordic countries have much in common there are also important differences between the innovation 
activities of these countries. Section three of the paper, then, presents - for four Nordic countries – an 
analysis of their innovation policies and how these have evolved towards their present stance. Finally, 
section 4 considers some of the lessons from the study.  
2. Innovation-activities in the Nordic region  
This section presents a descriptive analysis of the innovation activities of the four Nordic countries 
included in the study and a wider set of European countries with which the Nordic countries are 
compared. The main questions will be: How innovative are the Nordic countries compared to the rest of 
Europe? What are the characteristics of the innovation systems in the Nordic area, for example with 
respect to capabilities and resources for innovation, compared to systems elsewhere? To what extent do 
the firms in the various countries consider their national innovation systems to be supportive? The main 
source of information on innovation will be the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) which is based on 
information from many thousands firms all over Europe. This information is supplemented by statics 
from other sources, e.g., OECD and the World Bank, on various capabilities and resources of relevance 
for innovation. 
Figures 1-2 present statistics on the extent to which a country’s firms engage in innovation.  Although 
the questionnaire contains a relatively elaborate definition of innovation (with examples) to assist firms 
in their assessments it has to be kept in mind that the answers are influenced by the firms’ subjective 
perceptions and that this may influence the reported rankings.  
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Figure 1. Innovative Firms, 2010  
(broadly defined, share of all firms) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat  (CIS 7) 
 
Figure 1 reports the answer to the question of whether or not the firm has undertaken an innovation 
(independent of type) that was “new to the firm” during the year covered by the survey. This very broad 
definition of innovation evidently includes “innovations” in use elsewhere but not by the firm in 
question, i.e., activities that in other contexts might have been categorized as “imitation” or “diffusion”.  
However, such activities are of course economically very important, so their inclusion here might be 
seen as highly relevant. The results suggest than on average about half of Europe’s firms are innovative 
in this broad sense of the term, with Germany in a clear lead followed by Belgium. Three of the Nordic 
countries, Sweden, Finland and Denmark (in that order), have levels of innovation activity above the 
European average. The Norwegian level, in contrast, is clearly below average, on about the same level as 
the UK, Croatia and Spain, i.e., countries with much lower levels of productivity and income. 
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Figure 2.  Radical innovators, 2010 
(share of all firms)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on statistics from Eurostat (CIS 7) on innovations that are “new to 
the market” 
Figure 2 reflects the answers in the CIS survey about the extent to which a country’s firms have engaged 
in innovations that are not just new to the firm itself but also “new to the market”. Such innovation is 
clearly more demanding and, arguably, also more comparable across countries. The first thing to note is 
that the average propensity to innovate drops from 50% to 15% when this (narrower) definition of 
innovation is adopted. The dispersion around the mean also increases. However, the three Nordic 
countries that did well according to the broad definition continue to excel and perhaps even more so: all 
three countries are among the top five innovation performers in Europe in contrast to, as earlier, 
Norway, which continues to be below average. In fact, the gap between Norway and the other Nordic 
countries becomes larger when the stricter definition of innovation is applied. 
Another indicator which is commonly used in analyses of innovation at the national level is R&D as a 
share of GDP (Figure 3). R&D and innovation is not the same, i.e., not all R&D has innovation as its 
purpose, and not all innovation requires R&D. Still there is a close connection, since R&D – directly and 
indirectly – plays an important role in many innovation processes. 
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Figure 3. R&D as a share of GDP, average 2007-2011  
(total and by funding sector)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark are not only among the top innovation performers but also on the top 
when it comes to R&D investments. However, as before, Norway lags considerably behind.  Note also 
that the major reason why countries differ in R&D as a percentage of GDP is not differences in publicly 
financed R&D but differences in what the firms in the various countries spend for this purpose. 
However, innovation is not only or mainly about what happens inside firms but also about their ability to 
interact with other actors in the innovation system, being customers, suppliers, R&D institutions and so 
on. Figure 4 measures the extent of such cooperation in various European countries as reported by the 
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CIS. The results indicate that Finland trumps all other European countries in this respect by a wide 
margin.  But Sweden and Denmark also perform relatively well, while Norway’s performance is closer to 
the European average.  
Figure 4.  Innovation Cooperation, 2010 
(share of all innovative firms)
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat  (CIS 7) 
Having considered innovation performance, the role played by R&D and the degree of interaction 
between the actors in the system, we now shift the focus to some of the other societal factors that 
influence innovation at the national level such as the supply of finance for innovation, the skills of the 
labor force and the attitudes of population with respect to new technology. As for finance, as reflected 
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by the supply of venture capital,2 the picture is the by now a familiar one with Sweden and Finland close 
to the top, Norway lagging (close to the European average) and Denmark somewhere in the middle. 
 
Figure 5. Venture Capital, per cent of GDP, 2012 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on statistics from the OECD 
 
However, when it comes to skills, as reflected in the share of the labour force with tertiary education 
(Figure 6), all Nordic countries excel compared to the rest of Europe, and the same holds to a large 
extent for internet activity (Figure 7), used here as an indicator of the attitudes of the population to the 
adoption of new technologies.  
                                                          
2
 The OECD defines “Venture capital” as follows: Venture capital is a subset of private equity (i.e. equity capital 
provided to enterprises not quoted on a stock market) and refers to equity investments made to support the pre-
launch, launch and early stage development phases of a business.  
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Figure 6.  Tertiary education, average 2000-2006  
(Share of population age 25-64) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on statistics from the OECD. 
 
10 
 
Figure 7. Internet users, per cent, average 2008-2012
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on statistics from the World Bank   
 
Figure 8 is concerned with some of the same issues but from a different perspective, that of the firms 
themselves (as revealed by the CIS). The question in this case is what the firms regard as being the most 
important hampering factors for innovation. Unfortunately these data are a bit dated, as not all 
questions are included in all surveys and the number of countries participating in the different waves of 
the survey also differs somewhat. For what they are worth, however, the results indicate the national 
innovation systems in the Nordic countries are among the most conducive in Europe with respect to 
innovation in firms. Note also that the results confirm the finding from Figure 5 that access to finance is 
a constraining factor for innovation in the Norwegian case.  
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Figure 8.  Hampering factors for innovation, 2002-2004 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat  (CIS 4). Normalized by share of innovative firms in firm 
population. 
 
Summing up, the national innovation systems in the Nordic area are among the most advanced, if not 
the most advanced, in Europe, and – with the exception of Norway – this also holds for innovation 
performance. The general impression is that Sweden and Finland tend to lead, followed by Denmark, 
while Norway is lagging, particularly when it comes to innovation performance,3 but also with respect to 
the degree of interaction in the innovation system and the availability of finance for innovation. We will 
come back to the implications of these findings in the concluding section.   
                                                          
3
 How real is this gap? It has been argued that the industries in which Norway is specialized differ from most other 
industries with respect to how innovation is conducted, and that commonly used measures such as the ones 
presented earlier therefore fail to reflect the true performance of Norway.  There is some truth in this argument. 
For example, it has been shown that if one adjusts for differences in specialization patterns, the gap between 
Norway’s R&D performance and that of other countries at a similar level of development more or less disappears. 
However, Fagerberg et al (2009 a,b) have shown that this finding does not carry over to innovation: Differences in 
specialization patterns explain very little of the gap in innovation performance, as reported by the CIS, between 
Norway and the other Nordic countries. Thus the gap in innovation performance revealed by this study is most 
likely real. 
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3. Innovation policy in the Nordic region 
  
This section analyses the evolution of innovation policies – or policies affecting innovation - in the Nordic 
region, based on the existing literature on the subject. In each case we start by analyzing the origins of 
the innovation system, with a particular focus on the interaction between leading sectors of the 
economy, the emergence of external R&D providers and policy. We then analyze important policy 
challenges that have emerged, the responses to the challenges by policy-makers, the resulting changes 
in policy and the organizations associated with it and, finally, the current policy stance.  
To conduct the analysis we searched for comprehensive studies of the Nordic innovation systems and/or 
innovation policy. In the case of Sweden the study is to a large extent based on the very thorough report 
on the Swedish innovation system produced by the OECD in 2013 (OECD 2013). A similar study is 
available for Norway as well (OECD 2008).  We also benefitted from consulting the analysis of the 
evolution of the Norwegian innovation system in Fagerberg et al (2009a,b) and the extensive discussion 
of Norwegian innovation policy in Spilling (2010).  In the Finnish case a thorough evaluation (in two 
volumes) has been carried out by a panel of experts led by Veugelers (Evaluation 2009). Our account is 
based on their reports supplemented by a recent study by Miettinen (2013 ). Despite an extensive 
search no study of similar relevance and breadth was found in the Danish case. The above studies were 
in several cases supplemented with information from other sources, published or available through the 
web, to highlight particular issues.  
Sweden 
As the other Nordic countries Sweden largely missed “the first industrial revolution”.  Its major export 
sectors, e.g., forestry and mining, continued to be based on exploitation of natural resources. However, 
in contrast to this bleak performance, Swedish firms were quick to exploit the opportunities offered by 
“the second industrial revolution” around the turn of the twentieth century, based on innovations in 
production, distribution and use of electricity and oil (Edquist and Lundvall 1993). A number of firms, 
some of which (ABB and Ericsson for example) grew very large and became global players, emerged 
during these years in industries such as telecommunications, office machinery, electrical domestic 
equipment and transport equipment. Subsequently an important pharmaceutical industry also 
materialized.  
13 
 
Swedish innovation policy during the “golden age” of “the Swedish model” 
With hindsight the decades preceding the slump in the global economy in the mid-1970s may be seen as 
a “golden age” for the Swedish economy. Industrially the country was far ahead of its Nordic neighbors 
and arguably among the world leaders in many industrial areas. A characteristic feature was a very high 
level of R&D investments as a share of GDP, one of the highest in the world. As in other countries with 
high-R&D intensities the main source of this was investments made by private firms, particularly a 
number of large, internationalized companies. Nevertheless, public R&D investments, although small 
compared to those of the private sector, were also high by international standards, reflecting the broad 
consensus in Swedish society about an R&D-based growth path. These public R&D investments were 
concentrated in the university sector, which hence became pretty large. Thus two important pillars of 
the Swedish innovation system were a cluster of R&D-intensive, large firms and a strong university 
sector that served these firms with highly skilled labor and other services. The third pillar of the Swedish 
system, to be discussed below, was the state’s proactive role in promoting innovation in selected areas. 
“The Swedish model” is often used as a short hand for the close cooperation between big business, 
labor unions and the state that influenced Swedish politics and the social and economic development of 
the country from the 1930s onwards. A central goal for this cooperation was to increase productivity so 
that both healthy profits and increasing welfare for the population could be achieved. Technological 
progress, naturally, was seen as crucial for realizing this goal, and quickly attracted the attention of 
policy makers. A technical research council (TFR), the first of research council in Sweden, was set up in 
1940. It was succeeded in 1968 by STU, literally the “board for technological development” and later, in 
1991, by NUTEK (the directorate for industrial and technological change). A characteristic feature of 
Swedish science, technology and innovation was a strong emphasis on supporting university R&D, 
particularly in areas which policy-makers considered to be of high political and economic importance, 
such as nuclear energy or telecommunications. In addition, a major effort was made to engage the large, 
technologically advanced Swedish firms in (infrastructural) projects initiated by the state,  of which is the 
cooperation between the firm Ericsson and the Swedish telecommunication agency (Televerket) about 
the developments of digital switches (the AXE system) may serve as an example. Hence, during this 
period, the state played a quite proactive role in fostering innovation and the technological capabilities 
underpinning it. 
Economic frustrations and changes in the policy stance 
The rapid economic growth during the “golden age” came to a halt towards the end of the 1970s and in 
the decades that followed Swedish economic development was characterized by slow growth,  
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structural problems (in shipbuilding for example) and, from the early 1990s onward (when Sweden 
underwent a financial crisis), relatively high unemployment. “The Swedish Model”, which had been seen 
as big asset by many both in Sweden and elsewhere, was now generally regarded as a liability.  The view 
that direct government involvement in industry of the type practiced in Sweden, “picking winners” as it 
was called, was counterproductive gained currency almost everywhere. Hence, the type of innovation 
policy pioneered in Sweden – characterized by extensive public-private interaction – increasingly  
became out of tune with the neo-liberal rhetoric that dominated politics all over the western world 
around the turn of century. The privatization of public infrastructure providers, such as Televerket, and 
new competition legislation mandated by the European’ Union’s “internal market”, also made the 
innovation model based on public-private interaction pioneered in Sweden more difficult to pursue, and 
-  as a consequence - the practice was largely abandoned.  
Swedish innovation policy, from the 1990s onwards, gradually moved away from the strong sectoral 
focus which had characterized it in earlier decades. However, the strong emphasis on universities, and 
their R&D capabilities, as crucial inputs to firm-level innovation was retained or even strengthened. 
Policy aimed at supporting excellence in university R&D and strengthening the links between the 
university sector and private companies, often through various types of “centers” (in universities). The 
focus on linkages between the different actors in the system was of course consistent with the “national 
systems of innovation” approach which gained currency among both scholars and policy-makers during 
the 1990s, so much in fact that it gave name to VINNOVA, the Swedish Governmental Agency for 
Innovation Systems, which was established in 2001 as a new framework for some of NUTEK’s previous 
activities. In addition to supporting excellence in university R&D and interaction between firms and 
universities VINNOVA also places emphasis on supporting innovation activities in small- and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs), which receives about half of VINNOVA’s funding. A more recent addition to the 
Swedish innovation policy flora also supporting small firms and entrepreneurship is “Tillväxtverket” - 
The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth –  established in 2009. As the name suggests 
this agency, which also grew out of NUTEK, distinguishes itself from VINNOVA by having a clear regional 
focus.   
Challenges for governance 
As noted by the OECD (2013) the Swedish Innovation Policy landscape today contains many public actors, 
from rather large to quite small, that in various ways influence innovation. In addition to the innovation-
promoting agencies mentioned above, there exist a number of research-supporting bodies, the biggest 
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of which is VR (literally the Science council) with a budget of about 4 billion SEK, twice as much as 
VINNOVA, which is the second largest of these organizations in terms of annual budget. VR covers all 
areas of science, and the funding mainly goes to the largest and most prestigious universities in Sweden. 
The smaller, more recently established universities can also seek R&D support from a special 
organization created for this purpose: the KKS (the Knowledge Foundation). In addition, there are a 
number of other smaller funding agencies, each with its own specialized profile, from, for say, 
environmental/sustainability issues via health to working life and social issues. 
More could be said about the various organizations involved in supporting innovation in Sweden in one 
way or another but for our purpose the above will have to suffice. However, it is worth emphasizing that 
the fact that there are so many public organizations in this area – according to the OECD  Sweden 
outperforms all comparable countries in this respect by a wide margin (OECD 2013)– reflects that the 
Swedish governance system in this area is indeed quite fragmented. Several ministries are involved, the 
two most important being the Ministry for Education and Research and the Ministry of Enterprise, 
Energy and Communication. While the former has the main research council (VR) within its portfolio, the 
latter is responsible for VINNOVA.  In addition the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs and the Ministry 
of the Environment both have their own research funding bodies. Moreover, the focus of most of the 
ministries and the organizations within their responsibility tend to be squarely on research, which 
although a vital part of a national innovation system, is not identical with innovation.  The weak 
emphasis on innovation –  and innovation policy – among Swedish policy-makers  is also noted by the 
OECD  which observes that not even the ministry responsible for VINNOVA mentions innovation as one 
of its (nine) key responsibilities (OECD 2013, p.224) .  
Nevertheless, the fragmented nature of governance and policy implementation in this area surfaces 
from time to time as a challenge for policy-makers, and there have been some attempts to develop 
practices or policy instruments that overcome the problem. One such instrument is the Research and 
Innovation Bill to Parliament, which is coordinated by the Ministry for Education and Research. The 
focus here, however, is mainly on providing broad guidelines for public investments in research, how 
these should be spent (priorities) and how the results may be exploited so that the benefits to society 
from these investment are maximized (e.g., commercialization). In recent years, increasing investments 
in public R&D has been a priority of the government, reflecting its support for the R&D-driven growth 
path that has been a characteristic feature of the Swedish economy for a long time. The latest bill, for 
the period 2013-2016, in addition gives priority to research in the life sciences, arguably a policy 
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response to the sharp reduction of private R&D in Sweden in this field in recent years, following a series 
of foreign takeovers of large Swedish pharmaceuticals firms.   
Another attempt to provide a better coordination of policy in this area is the “national innovation 
strategy” coordinated by The Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications. The first attempt, 
published in 2004, advocated a broad approach to innovation policy and called for cooperation between 
major stakeholders in this area in the creation of a strategy for the future. To implement this idea an 
“Innovation Policy Council” was created, however, after a short while the idea was abandoned, and it is 
not clear that it in practice mattered much. A second attempt by the government to formulate such a 
strategy – termed “The Swedish Innovation Strategy” – surfaced in 2012. As the first version it advocates 
a broad approach to innovation policy and, commendably, pays homage to the grand societal challenges 
facing society such as climate change. However, the strategy is suitably unclear with respect to how this 
should be implemented in practice.  
Norway 
Throughout its history Norway’s economy has depended on exploitation of natural resources. Until the 
end of the nineteenth century fishery, forestry, mining and agriculture were the most important.4 In the 
early twentieth century hydroelectric energy, based on Norwegian waterfalls, created the basis for new, 
energy-intensive, export-oriented industries producing metals, chemicals, pulp and paper, fertilizers and 
so on. Closer to our own time, from around 1970 onwards, an oil and gas sector based on exploitation of 
resources on the Norwegian continental shelf developed.  
The origins of the Norwegian innovation system   
A knowledge-infrastructure catering for the needs of important industries slowly evolved. A mining 
college was established already in the 18th century, well before the country’s first university, 
established in Oslo in 1811.  An agricultural university was founded in 1859 and a public research 
organization focusing on ocean and marine research in 1900, both before the establishment of the 
country’s first technical university, NTH, in Trondheim in 1910 (a century after neighboring Sweden got 
its first technical university). At that time the development of the new, electricity-intensive industries 
were already under way, and NTH – and consulting activities by its academic staff - came to be an 
important source of knowledge and skills for their subsequent development.  Several specialized 
research institutes serving the needs of particular industries, such as for example the pulp- and paper 
                                                          
4
 Another important industry, not directly based on natural resources but on Norway’s long coast line, has been 
the shipping industry. 
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industry (PFI, established in 1916), also emerged. In general, Norwegian industry, particularly the 
natural-resource-based part, preferred to buy services from the PROs rather than investing heavily in 
internal R&D. As a result the share of R&D in value added in Norwegian industry became relatively low 
compared to other developed economies while the PROs or “institute sector” grew rather large. This 
unusual pattern was strengthened with the rapid growth of the Norwegian oil and gas industry, and the 
derived demand for knowledge and expertise, from the 1970s onwards, giving rise to an expansion (and 
reorientation) of the Norwegian PROs to meet the needs of the new industry.  Today, the largest of 
these is NTH’s consulting arm SINTEF, established in 1950, with more than 2000 employees. 
Modernization   
The high dependence on natural resources - and the perceived need to develop a more advanced, 
knowledge based industry as a substitute or complement to the natural resource-based sector – has 
been a recurrent theme in Norwegian politics. After the Second World War several influential politicians 
within the then ruling Labor Party  advocated the view that Norway needed to develop a strong 
presence in the  new science-based technologies of the time and the industries they had given rise to, 
such as electronics, telecommunications and atomic energy. In order to tilt the economy in that 
direction an elaborate system, with the newly created technical research council (NTNF, established 
1946) at its core, was created by the Ministry of Industry in cooperation with other ministries. Other 
important elements of this system were a series of governmental research institutes in areas such as 
defense (FFI, 1946), atomic energy (IFE, 1948) and telecommunications (TF, 1967) as well as parts of 
NTH and its consulting arm SINTEF. A number of firms, some of which newly created, were also involved, 
and for a while the system appeared quite dynamic. Moreover, the increasing emphasis on R&D (and 
R&D support) as a useful (and perhaps necessary) policy instruments influenced other ministries, which 
to a varying degree took steps to develop a supporting knowledge infrastructure in their own fields. 
Hence, a research council for agriculture emerged in 1946, a general research council in 1949, a research 
council for fishery in 1972 etc. Thus around 1970 the Norwegian innovation system had acquired a 
number of distinct features. This included a relatively large “institute sector” (the PROs) with substantial 
public funding serving various industries and parts of government with knowledge and expertise.  A 
relatively large and diversified “research council sector”, among other things supporting the PROs and 
their interaction with private firms, had also emerged.  
Problems emerge - changes in the policy stance  
The drive towards modernization ran into problems around 1980. First, the emphasis on electronics etc., 
while leading to a number of scientific achievements, did not translate into a lasting industrial success. 
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On the contrary the companies that took part in the modernization drive started to falter one by one, 
and today Norway does not any longer have large firms in the electronics and telecommunications 
industries. Even the major state owned defense firm, KV (Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk), a cornerstone in 
Labour’s efforts, went bankrupt and had to be reorganized. Second, trade liberalization and 
globalization made it more difficult for government to influence industrial development, for example 
sheltering “national champions” in selected industries from foreign competition. The wisdom of doing 
so was also questioned, as it was argued that it might just delay (necessary) structural changes and thus 
lead to social losses.  In short, as in other countries, neoliberal ideology was advancing, stressing the 
limitations of government and the virtues of free markets, undermining the legitimacy of the activist 
state-led approach adopted by Norwegian policy makers in earlier years. 
One consequence of these changes was that many previously state-owned research institutes were 
“privatized” and given greater responsibility for their long term survival. The problems that this might 
have created were cushioned by the rapid growth during these years of the oil and gas sector which 
became an important customer for many established institutes (such as SINTEF). Moreover, the various 
research councils were merged into one, NRF (Norges Forskingsråd), in 1993, in order to, it was argued, 
making the system more efficient and eliminating redundant (overlapping) activities. However, the 
organizational set-up of the new council reflected to a large extent the earlier structure. Although NFR 
was owned by a single ministry (nowadays the “Knowledge ministry” responsible for research and 
education), the other ministries continued to be responsible for research within their respective areas, 
which implied that the council had to negotiate with each individual ministry about what to do. This 
procedure, the so-called sector principle, meant that the council often had little leverage when it came 
to make decisions about what to do. Hence, the individual ministries continued to exercise considerable 
control of the research priorities in their respective areas. To a large extent, rather than shaping 
priorities and advising government, the new council turned into an executive body for the individual 
ministries, the most important of which are today the “Knowledge ministry” and the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry.  
The 2000s 
The innovation system approach, with its holistic perspective, was slow to penetrate the thinking of 
Norwegian policy makers. However, around the turn of the millennium innovation started to get more 
attention by policy makers and concepts such as “national innovation system” and “holistic innovation 
policies” became part of their vocabulary. The clearest evidence of this change was the plan for “a 
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holistic innovation policy” developed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and published in 2003. This 
plan described a concerted effort for increasing Norwegian innovation, including national as well as 
regional elements. It also emphasized the need for active coordination among stakeholders and 
between different parts of government.   
Several important changes in the government’s way to conduct innovation policy took place in the early 
years of the new millennium. In 2002 a dedicated “Innovation Division” was created within the research 
council to support R&D activities in firms, among other things through so-called “user-governed” R&D 
projects co-financed by firms and the council, a policy instrument inherited from the Division’s precursor, 
the technical research council (NTNF). This also holds for a number of targeted programs – to some 
extent located in other part of the council’s organization structure - supporting interaction between 
firms and PROs in areas such as ICT, oil and gas, fishery etc.  A new initiative by the council was the 
establishment of a number of “centers for research-driven innovation” (SFI) – temporary centers of 
excellence co-financed with industry - in prioritized areas (resembling the already existing “centers of 
excellence” – SFF - that the research council had promoted for some time already). 
In 2002 the government also introduced a new scheme for subsidizing firm-level R&D (“Skattefunn”). In 
theory this is a tax-credit, but since most of the firms that apply for support pay very little tax (if at all), 
the major part of the support is paid out as a subsidy. An important feature of the scheme is a strong 
incentive for firms to cooperate with external R&D providers, e.g. the PROs, which hence benefit 
financially from this arrangement.  In budgetary terms it is the largest among the government’s 
innovation policy instruments (Fagerberg 2009). However, only a small minority of Norwegian firms 
applies for such support, may be because most of them do not see themselves as R&D performers, or 
because there is a (rather low) cap on the subsidy which makes it much more attractive for small firms 
(and for firms with little R&D).  
Two years later, in 2004, the government created a new organization, named “Innovation Norway” (IN, 
Innovasjon Norge), through a merger of several existing public bodies providing economic support and 
services to industry, particularly in rural areas.  However, despite the name, most IN’s budget goes to 
subsidizing activities in rural areas (and/or primary industries) regardless of the innovation content of 
the supported activities (Riksrevisjonen 2008). It is possible that the government at the time considered 
the naming of the new organization to be a first step towards transforming it into a more powerful 
innovation actor, comparable to TEKES in Finland or VINNOVA in Sweden. However, in 2005 Norway got 
a new centre-left government, which – when faced with criticisms of Innovation Norway’s profile – 
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defended its ambiguous profile by stating that innovation was only one among several objectives for the 
organization.  The centre-left government also abandoned the previous government’s attempts to 
establish forums for coordination about innovation policy among stakeholders and across different parts 
of government.   
As a result Norwegian innovation policy today appears segmented, poorly coordinated and in lack of 
credible public innovation actors endowed with sufficient authority, competence and resources.5 
However, at the time of writing a new (right-wing) government has taken over. To what extent the new 
government will change the policy stance in this area remains to be seen.   
Post-oil? 
Since the 1970s the oil and gas industry has grown to become Norway’s major export sector and an 
important source of income for both the government and the population at large. As a consequence 
Norwegian wage-levels are now far above the other Nordic countries (while unemployment is much 
lower than elsewhere). The Norwegian innovation system, and not the least the “institute sector” 
(which is the largest recipient of funds from the research council, well above the universities), has 
contributed significantly to this success story by adapting to the growing industry’s need for knowledge, 
skills and expertise (Fagerberg et al 2009a,b). But will the happy days continue?  Concerns about the 
damaging effects of emissions from burning fossil fuels are mounting, and although global efforts to 
curb the emissions have not been successful so far, the possibility of this happening raises questions 
about the sustainability of the country’s present development path and, arguably, what policy 
instruments might possibly contribute to tilt the economy in a more sustainable direction. From such a 
perspective innovation policy might be highly relevant to consider.   
Finland 
Compared to its neighbors Finland is an industrial late-comer. Activities based on exploitation of natural 
resources, particularly agriculture and forestry, dominated the economy at least until the 1970s. 
However, subsequently Finland entered a period characterized by high growth, fast structural change 
and rapid increase in R&D investments with the consequence that Finland today is recognized by the EU 
as one of the “innovation leaders” in Europe (Innovation Union Scoreboard 2013). Innovation policy, 
broadly defined, came to play an important role in this transition. 
                                                          
5
 See Spilling (2010) for a discussion. 
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The origins of the Finnish Innovation System 
As in several other countries key economic sectors and a “knowledge infrastructure” catering for the 
needs of these sectors co-evolved over many years. Public research organizations (PROs) addressing the 
needs of the powerful agricultural and forestry sectors emerged already before the 2nd World War. 
These organizations continue to be among the largest PROs in Finland.  The 2nd World War gave rise to 
a new organization, VTT (The Technical Research Centre of Finland), supporting the Finnish war effort 
and the manufacturing base on which it depended. After the Second World War VTT ventured into a 
number of technological fields of relevance for the Finnish manufacturing industry, its transport sector, 
construction, energy provision etc.  Currently VTT has around 3000 employees, and on its website it 
prides itself of being “the biggest multitechnological applied research organization in Northern Europe”6. 
In the course of time several other PROs have been established by different parts of government to 
address issues of relevance for them. These organizations, and particularly VTT, continue to be 
important providers of knowledge-based services to Finnish firms, and their role has become a 
characteristic feature of the Finnish national innovation system. Although nowadays many of them, such 
as the VTT, get most of their income from customers, they also receive substantial economic support 
from (various parts of) government. 
After the Second World War many countries started to pay more attention to the important role played 
by science and tertiary education for long run economic development and Finland, although not among 
the forerunners, was no exception. A public organization dedicated to supporting scientific research - 
The Academy of Finland – was established in 1961. Moreover, the number of universities - and  the 
volume of tertiary education –  expanded rapidly  in the years that followed, with the consequence that 
the educational standard of the Finnish labor force improved significantly and today is among the 
highest in the world. Emphasis has also been placed on the development of primary and secondary 
education, with a particular focus on the qualifications of teachers, and according to the so-called PISA-
tests Finnish 15-year-old students rank among the best in the world in reading, mathematics and natural 
science (Miettinen 2013).  Public R&D investment also increased and is currently among the highest in 
the world when measured as a share of GDP.  Nevertheless, despite these achievements doubts have 
been expressed recently about the quality of Finnish science (Evaluation 2009), and an effort to increase 
the quality of Finnish research has become a central element in Finnish (innovation) policy in recent 
years, see below.   
                                                          
6
 http://www.vtt.fi 
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New public innovation actors: SITRA and TEKES  
A characteristic feature of Finnish innovation policy is the sustained focus on supporting structural 
changes in the economy away from the initial specialization in natural-resource based products, 
especially forestry, which for a long time dominated the country’s exports. During the 1960s and 1970s 
several steps were taken to achieve this goal.  In 1967 an independent public body supporting 
technological research, SITRA (The Finnish Innovation Fund), was established (as a part of  the Bank of 
Finland).7  Finnish policy makers decided to give priority to the electronics and telecommunication 
industries, and during the 1970s several initiatives were taken to support the development of national 
technological capabilities in these areas. In 1983 a new public organization, TEKES (The Technological 
Development Center), was created to support this process. The political weight attached to TEKES’ 
mission may be illustrated by the fact that its budget expanded rapidly and soon surpassed that of its 
older (basic research) counterpart, The Academy of Finland. It is also noteworthy that the rapid increase 
in TEKES’ budget continued in spite of the crisis in the Finnish economy around 1990, which resulted in a 
large drop in GDP and soaring unemployment, and led to significant budget cuts in many areas. In the 
2000s TEKES’ budget, of which about two thirds goes to firms and the remaining third to universities and 
PROs, had become twice as large as that of the Academy of Finland. 
A system perspective on governance emerges  
Finnish policy makers were quick to embrace the new, holistic understanding of innovation which 
emerged around 1990 under the label “national innovation systems”. An important vehicle for the 
diffusion of the NIS approach became the “Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland”, which was 
renamed “Research and Innovation Council” in 2009 as part of the adoption of “Finland’s Innovation 
Strategy” that year, see later. The council, chaired by the Prime Minister, is an advisory and coordinating 
body for research, technology and innovation policy, consisting of representatives from relevant 
ministries,  public innovation actors (such as TEKES, VTT and the university sector), major firms, business 
associations etc. and meets regularly. It also develops plans for the development and implementation of 
innovation policy in Finland and publishes every 3-4 year a “review” devoted to these issues. 
Miettinen (2013) has analyzed the development of these “reviews” since the early 1990s. The analysis 
shows that in the 1990s the focus was on strengthening public-private interactions, making the system 
more effective and – above all – increasing national investments in R&D which was seen a prerequisite 
for the development of a competitive, high-income, knowledge-based economy. More recent versions 
                                                          
7
 SITRA still exists but functions more as a strategic think-thank than as a distributor of funds (see Evaluation of the 
Finnish National Innovation System – Full Report, p. 25). 
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of the review has broadened the perspective on innovation with respect to what it is about (including 
so-called “social innovation” for example), where it takes place (not only in “high-tech”), how innovation 
may be encouraged (including demand- and user- driven innovation) and what it is relevant for (for 
instance the public sector as well). This broader perspective was also embraced by “Finland’s national 
innovation strategy” which was suggested in 2008 by a committee appointed by the Ministry of 
Employment and Economy and led by the then President of SITRA. The committee among other things 
suggested making innovation policy a more central part of general economic policy.    
Recent trends 
In recent years the Finnish government has taken several initiatives to reform the national innovation 
system.  The underlying rationale for these changes appears to be the argument that in a globalized 
world it is essential for a country to develop a limited number of centres of excellence that can function 
as global hotspots and points of attraction for skills and resources. These initiatives include a reform of 
the Finnish university system, through which the individual universities get greater independence, and 
the creation of a “world-class top university” in Finland – The Aalto University - through a merger of 
three universities in the Helsinki area.8 These reforms have been criticized by Miettinen (2013) for 
having a democratic deficit. While, he argues, previously large reforms were prepared by committees 
with broad societal participation, more recently policies have often been shaped by more narrow groups 
of people hand-picked by the government or individual ministries. 
Another initiative has been the creation of a number of so- called “SHOKs” (Strategic Centers for Science, 
Technology and Innovation) focusing not only on electronics but also on traditional industries such as 
forestry and metals. The SHOKs are (temporary) centres of excellence financed by industry, i.e., large 
established firms, and the government (TEKES).9 However, the panel of experts that evaluated the 
Finnish National Innovation System, while embracing the university reform,  had a more critical 
evaluation of the SHOKs, which they considered might contribute to conserve the country’s industrial 
structure, rather than supporting novel initiatives in new areas, which they saw as equally if not more 
important  (Evaluation 2009).   
                                                          
8
  These were the Helsinki University of technology, the Helsinki Business school  and the University of Arts and 
Design 
9
 In Finland innovation policy is also a central element of regional policy, and this includes among other things the 
establishment of a series of «Centers of expertise». These will not be discussed here. See Evaluation (2009) for a 
discussion of this issue. 
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Finnish innovation policy has been characterized by a strong focus on the electronics industry. The prime 
success story has been the firm NOKIA, which in an amazingly short time transformed itself into a global 
telecommunications giant. However, in recent years the company has struggled, many jobs have been 
lost, and recently its consumer division was sold to Microsoft. Do these experiences imply that the focus 
of policy and its implementation needs to be reconsidered?  This is no doubt an issue that will be 
discussed in Finland in the years ahead. 
Denmark 
Historically Denmark has been a predominantly agricultural economy, and the main export product was 
grain. However, over the years the share of processed agricultural products (bacon, meat, cheese etc.) in 
production and exports increased, and by the early 1900s most of Denmark’s exports consisted of 
processed products. During the twentieth century Danish industry successfully ventured into a number 
other areas such as pharmaceuticals, medical instruments and environmental technology.  R&D 
investments also increased, not the least in the private business sector, and Denmark is now one of the 
top performers in Europe when it comes to R&D (Figure 3).  
 
The origins of the Danish innovation system 
The large and economically important agricultural sector is an important pillar of the Danish innovation 
system, and a set of organizations supporting the development of this sector evolved from the 18th 
century onwards. An association supporting technological change in agriculture (Det Kongelige Danske 
Landhusholdningsselskab) was formed in 1769. Local associations all over Denmark subsequently 
followed. The association(s) supported the development of extension services (so-called agricultural 
consultants, employed by the local associations), as well as the creation of agricultural colleges, the first 
of which was established in 1837. The colleges became from the mid-1800s onwards supplemented by a 
large number of so-called “folk high schools” providing basic training to (young) people from (mainly) 
rural areas. At the national level a Veterinary Institute was established in 1773, and in 1856 it was 
decided to expand it into an agricultural university (Landbohøjskolen). Most of these organizations 
continue to exist although some changes have of course taken place over the years, for example, in 2007 
the agricultural university was merged with the University of Copenhagen.    
 
Another strong pillar in the Danish system is provided by its universities. The University of Copenhagen, 
established in 1479, has for centuries been one of the hotspots for science and higher education in the 
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Nordic area. In 1829 an engineering college was established as part of the university and subsequently 
developed into an independent technical university (The Technical University of Denmark, DTU). Several 
other universities were also established over the years, mostly after the Second World War. Today 
Danish Universities are renowned for high quality research. Articles published by Danish scientists on 
average attract more citations in prestigious scholarly journals than works written by scientists from 
other Nordic countries. Several Danish scientists have also been awarded Nobel prizes for their work. 
 
Research and innovation policy in the Danish context 
Traditionally, Danish politicians have been much more concerned about research than about innovation, 
although over the years the latter has got increasing attention. 
 
A number of research councils, reflecting disciplinary and sectorial divisions, were established in 1968 
and a technical research council followed four years later, in 1972. These councils received funding from 
different ministries; hence the system became quite fragmented and a need for better coordination 
appeared. Various attempts were made over the years to create specific organizations to take care of 
this need. However, a Ministry responsible for both the research councils and the research at the 
universities – the Research Ministry (Forskningsministieriet) – did only emerge in 1998.  
 
During the 1990s Danish policy makers came to place more emphasis on supporting excellence, among 
other things through the creation of a new fund for basic research in 1991, which financed temporary 
centres of excellence in a number of areas. Moreover, especially from the mid 1990s onwards, Danish 
policy makers begun to channel a part of the public R&D funding to areas of high priority. These 
included areas of traditional strength, such as food, biotechnology, nutrition and health, but also 
environmental technology, new materials and ICTs. A substantial share of public R&D funding, estimated 
to be around 35-40 per cent of the total (DEA 2011), went to these areas. Questions related to 
knowledge transfer, public private interaction and commercialization also started to attract more 
attention from policymakers. Thus, although couched as research policy, several policy instruments that 
in other contexts might have been seen as associated with discussions about innovation policy, emerged 
on Danish policy makers’ agendas around the turn of the century. 
 
During the first few years of the new millennium a number of changes took place.  First the Ministry of 
Research was relabeled “Ministry of Science, Technology and Development”. Then – in 2002-2003 - a 
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reform of the research council structure took place. The new structure included several councils for 
basic research, a “Council for Strategic Research” and a special “Council for Technology and Innovation” 
(as a successor to Technical Research Council). Hence, the “I”-word was now firmly established in the 
Danish policy vocabulary.  Since its creation the council has produces a series of ambitious action plans 
(with concrete targets) for how to increase innovation activity in Danish firms, industries and sectors. In 
2004 a new fund, “The Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation”, intended to tilt the Danish 
economy in a “high-tech” direction by investing risk-capital in new promising high-tech ventures, was 
added to the research council portfolio. In addition, a “Danish Growth Foundation”, providing risk-
capital for innovative businesses in cooperation with similar organizations at the regional/local level, 
was established by the Ministry for Business and Growth in 2006. 
The “globalization strategy” and beyond 
In 2006 the then Danish (centre-right) government published its “globalization strategy” about how to 
retain Denmark’s position as one of the best places to live and work in a world characterized by 
increasing global competition. Although it was noted that “failing to innovate, it may be difficult to 
maintain Denmark’s position as one of the world’s wealthiest countries” (p.7), there was little discussion 
in the document of how innovation might be encouraged and seemingly no attempt to take into account 
the findings from international research on this topic from the last fifty years or so. Rather the main 
focus was on “improving the efficiency of public spending on education and research, in particular by 
allocating more public funds in open competition, and on increasing competition and 
internationalization in the Danish economy as a whole” (ibid). The stated goal was that “Denmark should 
be the world’s most competitive society by 2015” (p. 17) assuming – probably – that this would be 
sufficient for elevating innovation as well. The government also embraced the European Union’s 3 % 
target for R&D as percentage of GDP, with a third of this coming from public sources. As a result public 
investments in R&D grew quickly in the years that followed, and in contrast to many other EU member 
countries Denmark actually met the target (at the end of the decade as envisaged).  
  
Consistent with the “globalization strategy” important changes took place in the university sector after 
the turn of the millennium. A new university law from 2003 introduced new forms of governance and a 
stronger emphasis on the so-called “third mission”(i.e., knowledge transfer and commercialization). 
During 2006-2007 a major reorganization of the sector took place and a number of universities were 
merged so that the number of Danish universities dropped by one third (from 12 to 8). In addition, 
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public research organizations outside universities did in most cases lose their independence as they 
were merged with the universities. 
 
Recently, Danish policy on innovation has taken a new twist.10 In October 2013 the government 
announced an agreement between the main political parties on the creation of a “large new innovation 
foundation” through the merger of three existing organizations, namely the “Council for Technology and 
Innovation”, the “Council for strategic research” and the “Advanced Technology Foundation”. The new 
foundation is planned to have an independent board and be at “arms-length of the political system”. It 
is envisaged to have a budget of DKK 1,5 Billion, i.e., about the same level as the Swedish VINNOVA but 
substantially less than its Finnish counterpart, TEKES. The new innovation foundation is still not in 
operation and what role it will play remains to be seen. Potentially, however, this may be a step towards 
the creation of a more powerful innovation-policy actor – and more effective innovation policy – in 
Denmark.     
4. Concluding remarks 
This section sums up some of the lessons from the discussions in the previous sections and points to 
issues in need of further research. 
In section 2 of this paper the innovation systems in the Nordic countries were compared to systems 
elsewhere in Europe along a number of dimensions reflecting innovation performance, the working of 
the innovation system and access to capabilities and resources of importance for innovation. The 
analysis showed that with respect to capabilities and resources the Nordic countries are among the 
most advanced in Europe. This achievement is arguably related to a broad set of policies pursued over a 
number of years, not the least with respect to education and gender equality, as well to the prevalence 
of norms and attitudes conducive to innovation and diffusion of technology (Fagerberg 2010). However, 
a more thorough treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper (see Dølvik 2013 for an 
extended discussion).       
Nevertheless, when it comes to innovation performance a gap appears between Norway, with a 
performance level close to the European average, and the three other countries which are well above 
the average and arguably among the innovation leaders in Europe. Although this finding, which also has 
been reported by other studies, has been surrounded by controversy, our reading of the evidence is that 
                                                          
10
 http://fivu.dk/en/newsroom/press-releases/2013/large-new-innovation-foundation-to-solve-societal-
challenges-and-create-jobs 
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the gap in innovation performance revealed in this and other studies is most probably real.  If true, this 
raises the question of why Norway gets less innovation out of its capabilities and resources than other 
countries do. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore that question in the required 
depth.   
The analysis in section 3 revealed that the historical origins of the various Nordic innovation systems 
matter for how innovation policies subsequently developed. For example, the countries with well- 
developed university systems over a century ago, i.e., Denmark and Sweden, have developed innovation 
policies in which universities play a very central role. This is still the situation. In contrast, Finland and 
Norway  - younger nation states with less-well developed university systems a century ago – developed 
systems in which public research organizations outside universities – the “institutes”- became large and 
powerful actors in the innovation system. This continues to be the case today. For example, Finland’s 
leading PRO – VTT – has around 3000 employees, and in Norway the “institutes” collectively get more 
funding through the research council than the universities do. Hence, for historical reasons innovation 
systems differ a lot, and this needs to be taken into account when designing and implementing policy. A 
mechanical transfer of so-called “best practice” from one system to another may easily do more harm 
than good. 
In this paper we have adopted a broad definition of innovation policy which includes all policies (and 
policy instruments) that affect innovation performance (in a non-trivial way). From this perspective it is 
evident that the phenomenon innovation policy is older than the term. How far back in history 
innovation policies can be traced is not an issue that we will discuss here. However, it is evident that a 
lot of what was attempted in Sweden, Norway and Finland during the post-war period under labels such 
as “science policy”, “technology policy” and “industrial policy” might just as well have been labeled 
“innovation policy” (and probably would have got that label today). Some of these policies had a 
significant impact, while others can probably be categorized as failures. There may still be a lot to learn 
from such past policy experiments, which deserve further study.  
Particularly in Sweden, but to some extent in Norway as well, quite ambitious policies were pursued 
during the 1960s and 1970s aiming at supporting and strengthening the role of “high-tech” industry, e.g., 
telecommunications and electronics. Finland adopted this agenda later, i.e. from the 1980s onwards, 
and arguably with even greater force (and better results?).  Although «targeting» increased in Denmark 
as well during the 1980s and 1990s, this was more limited in scope. Why Danish policy developed 
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differently from the other Nordic countries is an interesting question which we cannot consider in the 
necessary detail here (see however Asheim and Mariussen (2010) for a take on this issue). 
The last few decades have witnessed important changes in how innovation policy is conceived, 
organized and carried out in all four countries. To some extent the trends are similar: There has been an 
increasing attention to innovation as an important object for policy everywhere in the Nordic area. 
Moreover, new organizations within the public sector devoted to supporting innovation have been 
created in in all four countries, such as TEKES in Finland (1983), VINNOVA in Sweden (2001), The 
Norwegian Research Council’s Innovation Division (2002) and Innovation Norway (2004) in Norway, and 
The Council for Technology and Innovation (2002-3) and the new Innovation Foundation to be set up in 
2014 in Denmark. However, Finland stands out by having much more ambitious policies, much greater 
involvement of the political leadership of the country and other important actors in the policy process, 
and a much more powerful and well-funded innovation agency (TEKES). Why this is the case, what the 
consequences are and what can be learnt are interesting and relevant questions that we cannot 
consider in the required depth in this paper but which certainly deserve attention.   
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Finnish policy makers were early movers with respect to 
adopting the new “innovation system” approach to policy that started to diffuse around 1990.  This new 
and more holistic approach placed strong emphasis on the need for policy coordination. Finland is 
unique among the Nordic countries in having a policy coordinating body on technology and innovation 
policy led by the prime minister. The innovation system approach also had some influence in Sweden, 
and its adoption led as mentioned to the formation of VINNOVA 2001. However, as noted by the OECD 
(2013), VINNOVA is not as well endowed with resources as TEKES, there are many other relevant actors 
in the Swedish setting, coordination is weak and innovation policy does not appear to be an important 
topic on the government’s agenda. The latter by and large also holds for Norway, which despite the 
creation of new, large agencies in this area has developed a very fragmented system with little if any 
coordination among the relevant ministries (Fagerberg 2009). In Denmark it is difficult to trace much 
influence of the innovation system approach on policy discussions, and innovation policy appears – until 
recently at least – not to be regarded as a central issue. Why the new ideas on systems and policy have 
spread so unevenly in the four countries under study here is an intriguing question.  
However, writing about innovation policy in the Nordic area is like shooting at a moving target. For 
example, Denmark is in the process of getting a new, potentially much more powerful innovation agency. 
Norway just had elections and it is possible that the new government will place more emphasis on 
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innovation policy. Sweden is going to have an election, and there are some indications of increasing 
attention to the topic there too. So interest in innovation policy is probably not going to go away. A 
possible future path might be one with a greater emphasis on the potential contribution of innovation 
policy to the solution of grand challenges, e.g., the climate challenge, as suggested by the OECD in its 
advice to both the Swedish and the Norwegian government (OECD 2008, 2013). “New” topics, such as 
innovation in the public sector, “social innovation” and the roles of work organization and social security 
systems for innovation (Lorenz 2013), may also get more attention. 
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